More Info Comes Out On “The Shot.”

I have just submitted an article on the shooting down of USA 193 and I am kind of miffed that I missed this little gem from the folks that give us Aviation Week and Space Technology.

It seems that the flight characteristics of the satellite were not as predictable as has been made out in analysis.

…”[The dead satellite] was not stable,” Hicks says. “It was rolling and tumbling and [its gyration] wasn’t always the same from one orbit to another, which added to the technical challenge. We tried for six weeks to see what was predictable about what it was doing each orbit, and we just couldn’t do it.”…

The Hicks cited here is Rear Admiral Brad Hicks. That’s an interesting observation. We know that they targeted the fuel tank itself and we see here that USA 193 was gyrating and in an apparently chaotic manner from orbit to orbit. In other words the shot was more of a technical challenge than has been presented hitherto.

For us strategic nerd types that’s important because the more challenging the shot was the more strategic significance it has.

The article furthermore makes interesting statements on Radar and Sensor integration

…As a result, gathering radar and infrared information on the satellite was crucial and the results are considered a huge incentive to rapidly integrate the nation’s sensors that are capable of characterizing objects in space.
“We needed everything to come together to give us the knowledge we needed. It was a totally dead satellite [so there was no maneuvering],” Hicks says. “There were early warning radars. There also were sensors in space. The problem is to not integrate too much. It can rapidly become unaffordable. We’re looking at the after action reports and STRATCOM is to pull together [recommendations on future radar integration].”
Other radars in the effort included those designed for THAAD, Alaska’s SBX and the targeting and test radars at Barking Sands, Hawaii…

In other words all this X-band radar, early warning radars, SBIRS, sea based X-Band radar, Aegis phased array radars, space situational awareness programmes and so on are all part of a whole seamless web.
That’s a nice way of demonstrating the tight nexus between Ballistic Missile Defense and the weaponisation of space and the way in which the former acts as a Trojan horse for the latter. The article also states

…But now that the shootdown has been done once, the capability – which took six weeks to put together – possibly could be duplicated even faster. While U.S. officials say it was a one-time event, they also say they learned a lot that might not have to be repeated for a second anti-satellite (ASAT) mission…

So, you see, it was an ASAT test after all…

The Missing Nuclear Warhead Fuzes

We have seen the reports on the discovery that a shipment of fuzes for the Minuteman III ICBM was sent to Taiwan, ostensibly in error. Theoretically we are talking about either the fuze to detonate theW62, W78 or W87 warheads. Firstly we are talking here about the nose cone assembly of the Mk12 RV according to a report I have seen

…The fuses are housed in nose cones that are fitted to the warhead of a Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile. They are used to ignite the trigger of a Mark-12 nuclear weapon, officials said…

The warhead that corresponds to the Mk12 is the W62. The W62 is on the way out so this “mistake” might be like the B-52 error which seemingly involved a part of the US nuclear arsenal heading for the chop.

If so, what’s next?

In reports US officials are stating that the fuze is mated for a specific weapons platform only. But the W78 uses the Mk12-A RV so that might not be accurate. The W78 was meant to improve the hard-target kill capability of the W62 so presumably would have a different fuzing option but thus far I see no reason why the nose cone assembly of the Mk12 and Mk12-A should differ so markedly that the fuze of the W62 could not be employed in the RV for the W78 as well.

Just some out loud thoughts.

It is clear that the discovery of the mistake was actually made by the Taiwanese

… Taiwan received four drum-shape packages from the United States in August 2006 and placed them, unopened, into storage. Taiwanese officials realized only recently that the packages contained the nose cones when they went looking for the helicopter batteries, U.S. defense officials said…

It is interesting that the discovery was made, according to reports, a matter of days after the Taiwanese election which saw the election of a more China friendly candidate in a landslide. It is also worthy to note that the Taiwanese knew that what they were presented with was the nose cone of an RV when they went to recover the batteries although that wouldn’t have been too hard to figure out.

Not emphasised here is the error on both sides; the US sent the nose cone of a nuclear missile RV by mistake and the Taiwanese accepted them thinking they were batteries also by mistake but realised when they went to get the supposed Huey helicopter batteries straight away that they were not batteries.

Hmmm.

Taiwan has had a nuclear weapons programme in the past. Could this have been a deliberate transfer? A lot has been said on the error since it has come to light but Joseph Cirincione has said it best

…”Imagine how we would feel if the Russians accidentally shipped warhead fuses to Tehran,” Cirincione said. “We’d be going nuts right now.”…

I’m not saying it was a deliberate transfer. Only, it is a theoretical possibility; the whole thing has come to light after the Taiwan elections and US officials may have been telling us a fib about the one on one match between the fuze and the specific weapon.

When the story broke a few days ago officials presented it as not that big a deal. The fuze was just a smallish thing.

This is the Saddam defence. Before the 1991 Gulf War Saddam got busted on a shipment of Krytons which are high speed electrical triggers used to set off conventional explosives with high precision. At a press conference he held one of them, they are small, and laughed off the affair arguing that such a small piece of shit is a long way off from a nuclear weapon.

Funny that the Saddam defence should be trotted out but then again Saddam and the neo-Reganites have an affinity going way back.

By the way there is an interesting article by a conservative hawk. He has let the cat out of the bag on Eastern European BMD for in a typical hawkish piece on Naval power and global power projection it’s stated

…A single Aegis warship equipped with anti-ballistic interceptors and deployed in the Persian Gulf could undercut the credibility of any Iranian nuclear threat…

When you get a quote like that from a conservative hawk you just have to file it away.

Update: I have just come across a report in the Washington Post that clarifies matters some. It is clear that we are talking about the nose cone assembly of the Mk12 RV which is associated with the W62 warhead

…The parts that the United States shipped to Taiwan are Mark 12 nose-cone assemblies, which have 1960s technology and are being phased out by the Air Force in favor of nose cones compatible with newer Mark 12A warheads for its Minuteman III missiles. There are about 700 Mark 12 assemblies in the U.S. inventory, and the Air Force has been shipping excess to the Pentagon’s Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for storage at an air base in Utah. The assemblies do not contain nuclear material but help trigger a detonation as a ballistic missile nears its target.

U.S. officials said yesterday it appears that workers at the DLA initially did not determine that the materials Taiwan received were classified because the outside of the packages had unclassified inventory codes that indicated they contained batteries. Quarterly inventory checks — about 10 of them — also missed the error, and the discrepancy was not discovered until Thursday. Air Force and DLA spokesmen declined to comment and referred questions to the Pentagon…

However I am puzzled by this

…After Taiwanese officials reported in early 2007 that four packages they had received from the U.S. military did not contain the helicopter batteries they had expected, U.S. officials suggested that Taiwan simply dispose of the incorrect items — which turned out to be parts for U.S. nuclear missiles…

and

…U.S. government officials familiar with the communications said yesterday that at some point between August 2006 and last week, Taiwan opened the drum-shaped packages and noticed that the items inside were labeled “secret” and that they included Mark 12 nose cones, which are used with U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles…

So they knew in Taiwan that the package from the US did not contain inside batteries without opening them up despite being so labelled (Ok batteries and nose cone assemblies are not exactly the same size) and only last week decided to actually open them and hence thereby found out they were fuzes for the Mk12/W62. What I am asking is. Why leave that crucial part so late?

Pretty odd. At a minimum we have two mistakes of the very same sort i.e. involving parts or whole warheads of nuclear weapons being retired.

Not a good batting average.

Strategic Command and the Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism

The commander in chief of US Strategic Command has made some interesting comments about deterrence and nuclear terrorism

… The general who commands the U.S. nuclear arsenal said last week he is studying how best to deter terrorists from using weapons of mass destruction.

”How do you address the al-Qaedas of the world who would love to get their hands on a weapon of mass destruction and employ it against the United States?” “How do you deter that entity?” U.S. Strategic Command chief Gen. Kevin Chilton asked during a session with reporters “These are really hard questions that we believe we have to address and think about [and] report on.”…

“For example, could Osama bin Laden be turned away from using a weapon of mass destruction if he became convinced that global revulsion to that act would hinder his future ability to recruit new operatives?”

“It’s not one-size-fits-all for deterrence,” Chilton said. “What motivates that individual?” “What do they value?” What do they fear?” What is [an] unacceptable risk to them?”…

Of course Strategic Command has operational control over the US nuclear triad so it is to be expected that many would draw the inference from these remarks that the US is studying ways of deterring nuclear terrorism through the use of nuclear weapons.

The comments about Bin Laden made by Chilton are not relevant. That would be “self-deterrence” and has nothing to do with StratCom. The 2007 NIE on terrorism does not tie in with Chilton’s comments about self-deterrence

… We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it develops what it deems is sufficient capability…

What is interesting is that this kinda ties into Rumsfeld’s metric on the “global war on terrorism” namely can (and is) the US eliminating terrorist cadres faster than Jihadi groups can replace them? Could Chilton be telling us that this is the metric to be used for assessing the deterrence of Al Qaeda?

That is can one deter Al Qaeda by presenting a credible threat to degrade the capability to recruit cadres? Quite frankly I don’t see how StratCom could have anything to do with that. Chilton also stated that

… In response to such questions, the United States might not necessarily select a military tool to achieve deterrence, but rather “an economic solution or diplomatic solution,” said the commander, whose headquarters are based in Omaha, Neb…

On the surface this would have nothing to do with StratCom. But could the thinking here be that StratCom ought to present a credible nuclear threat in order to buttress a “economic solution or diplomatic solution”? That would be compellence not deterrence.

A StratCom spokesperson was also cited as stating

… At Strategic Command, intelligence and policy analysts are “constructing a deliberate plan to address the violent extremist organization threat,” Air Force Col. Les Kodlick, the organization’s spokesman, said today. “Determining how to most effectively deter WMD terrorism is an ‘ongoing’ process”, he said.

Command officials do not anticipate releasing an unclassified report on this matter, Kodlick said. However, the spokesman added, “any information in this [area] that can be made public, will.”…

In other words there is a secret StratCom report on the deterrence of nuclear terrorism. It would be good to try and get an FOI request on that no matter how redacted the report would be. The “constructing a deliberate plan” might be revealing.

Is StratCom constructing an attack plan for OPLAN-8044 assuming scenarios involving nuclear terrorism? Are these attack plans directed at Pakistan and North Korea?

I have blogged about deterrence and nuclear terrorism before and there was a good report in the New York Times that is worth going through again

… Among the subjects of the meeting last year was whether to issue a warning to all countries around the world that if a nuclear weapon was detonated on American soil and was traced back to any nation’s stockpiles, through nuclear forensics, the United States would hold that country “fully responsible” for the consequences of the explosion. The term “fully responsible” was left deliberately vague so that it would be unclear whether the United States would respond with a retaliatory nuclear attack, or, far more likely, a nonnuclear retaliation, whether military or diplomatic

But that meeting of Mr. Bush’s principal national security and military advisers in May 2006 broke up with the question unresolved, according to participants…

Then, on Oct. 9, North Korea detonated a nuclear test…

Could this StratCom report and the construction of the StratCom “deliberate plan” have followed these series of meetings?

There have been a number of interesting reports on nuclear forensics and nuclear terrorism that have appeared in the public domain an important one being from the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Citing from the exec summary

… The chain of participants in a nuclear terrorist event most likely includes a national government or its agents, since nearly all nuclear weapons usable material is at least notionally the responsibility of governments. A forensics capability that can trace material to the originating reactor or enrichment facility could discourage state cooperation with terrorist elements and encourage better security for nuclear weapon usable materials. In addition, most terrorist organizations will not have members skilled in all aspects of handling nuclear weapons or building an improvised nuclear device. That expertise is found in a small pool of people and a credible attribution capability may deter some who are principally motivated by financial, rather than ideological, concerns…

This refers to deterring states from being actively involved in the casual loop preceding a nuclear terrorist event. But StratCom, according to Chilton, includes the direct deterrence of retail terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda. I don’t buy Chilton’s remarks on that.

The report goes on

… Nuclear forensics for attribution involves comparing data and analyses from the samples recovered to data and analyses from samples from identified sources. Forensic analysis for attribution therefore requires that data concerning foreign-origin material be available. Some of these data exist in the United States but many more reside abroad, in international and national databases, in sample archives, and elsewhere. Therefore, nuclear forensic analysis would benefit from as much international cooperation as possible…

That’s an important issue. But notice the “encourage better security for nuclear weapon useable materials” part in the report. According to that Times article

…“We need to distinguish between the leakage problem, where it would be inadvertent, and the provider problem, where it would be an intentional act,” said Robert S. Litwak of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the author of “Regime Change: U.S. Strategy Through the Prism of 9/11.”

“To the provider we should say, ‘Don’t even think about it,’ and this more explicit declaratory policy can get us traction because these regimes value their own survival above all else,” Mr. Litwak said. “For the leakage problem, we don’t want to be trapped into a question of how we retaliate against Russia or Pakistan. But through calculated ambiguity, we can create incentives for the Russians and the Pakistanis to do even more in the area of safeguarding their weapons and capabilities.”…

In other words this is a “negligence doctrine” for deterring nuclear terrorism. Because we perceive your security to be slack etc we are gonna smash you with nukes because there was leakage of nuclear materials from your facilities which was used by a Jihadi group.

Notice that, seemingly, that includes Russia.

Could OPLAN-8044 have an attack plan directed at Russia as a potential response to a nuclear terrorist event? Surely not.

Actually the Russian example is instructive. Not much discussion on nuclear forensics and deterrence notices an important feature of the states of concern that have stockpiles of nuclear materials. In discussion usually Russia, Pakistan or North Korea are mentioned as examples of places where terrorists may acquire nuclear materials for a nuclear explosive device.

But notice all three states are also nuclear weapon states. Russia has a strategic deterrent directly targeted at the US. North Korea presumably bases its deterrence capacity around nuclear armed Nodong IRBMs targeted at Japan. Pakistan does not posses a direct deterrence capacity against the United States.

But what if attribution where to state that nuclear materials came from a nuclear weapons state? Could Strategic Command credibly threaten deterrence in a situation characterised by mutual deterrence? Notice that this question would apply even to conventional StratCom responses based on a prompt global strike capability.

The deterrence of nuclear terrorism therefore requires a credible capability to launch a nuclear strike (even for conventional responses) whilst also controlling escalation through a strategy of escalation dominance. That means nuclear postures characterised by nuclear war fighting doctrines.

There are some other issues. Firstly, the deterrence of nuclear terrorism by way of nuclear forensics would require at a minimum international co-operation and ideally an international regime providing a good background database on nuclear materials. As the Times states (and the APS and AAAS report too)

… Mr. Bush was able to issue a credible warning, other senior officials said, in part because the International Atomic Energy Agency has a library of nuclear samples from North Korea, obtained before the agency’s inspectors were thrown out of the country, that would likely make it possible to trace an explosion back to North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. The North Koreans are fully aware, government experts believe, that the United States has access to that database of nuclear DNA.

But when it comes to other countries, many of that library’s shelves are empty. And in interviews over the past several weeks, senior American nuclear experts have said that the huge gap is one reason that the Bush administration is so far unable to make a convincing threat to terrorists or their suppliers that they will be found out. …

Why give the US a database that would open you to a OPLAN-8044 “deliberate plan”? To co-operate would be to tacitly co-operate in your own nuclear targeting. Sure Australia might participate in such a regime but that doesn’t mean much. In fact why would you even want to participate in IAEA safeguards with such a nuclear strategy floating in the air?

It’s a contradiction.

Secondly, we come to self-referential paradox of nuclear terrorism. I cite from my article at Australian Policy Online

… In reality, a “negligence doctrine” would make an act of nuclear terrorism more likely. Jihadi groups like Al Qaeda are revolutionary – or, more accurately, counter-revolutionary – vanguards who see their main strategic task as mobilising a dissatisfied but apathetic population. In this sense they have been highly influenced by Lenin and the Bolsheviks. It is not hard to see how a “negligence doctrine,” rather than deterring nuclear terrorism, would actually encourage Jihadi groups to attempt to get their hands on the necessary fissile materials for a nuclear device because the prospect of a US nuclear counter-strike on such obviously immoral grounds would enrage, and hopefully radicalise, the entire Islamic world…

Hence the paradox

Attempting to deter nuclear terrorism using nuclear weapons will make the act that is sought to be deterred more likely to occur

Whatever we might think about rational expectations in macroeconomic theory it’s a bit like the idea that high inflationary expectations leads to higher inflation even if there might not be an underlying structural cause for inflation.

Consider Rumsfeld’s metric. A US attack using nuclear weapons on the basis of a negligence doctrine would lead to plenty of people in the Islamic world seeking to become a cadre. Contra Chilton this would be the main strategic rationale for retail Jihadi groups to engage in nuclear terrorism.

That’s hardly self-deterrence but it is also hardly deterrence either.

The Global War on Terror will increase the nuclear terrorist threat. More on my thinking about that later.

But remember that Clinton era study by StratCom on “essentials of post cold war deterrence” that the US must appear “irrational and vindictive” that it would hurt the US to portray itself as rational and cool headed if its vital interests are attacked.

Nothing on the deterrence of nuclear terrorism by way of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with that Clinton administration study.

Sarko on French nukes

Sarkozy in a major speech on France and nuclear weapons has done three things (1) announced reductions in the size of the French nuclear arsenal (2) re-affirmed that France has a global conception of strategic nuclear deterrence and (3) again called for a “dialogue” on a Euro deterrent.

First the cuts. It is clear that what Sarko is putting forward is a 1/3 cut in the number of aircraft delivered warheads. To which we shall return.

In his speech Sarko stated

…”Countries in Asia and the Middle East are rapidly developing ballistic capacities,” he said in a defence policy speech to mark the inauguration of a new-generation nuclear submarine named The Terrible.

“I am thinking in particular of Iran,” which is “increasing the range of its missiles while serious suspicions weigh on its nuclear programme,” …

This re-affirms what we have known for some time namely that France is developing a globalised conception of nuclear strategy in the second nuclear age much like the United States which has moved from a rigid SIOP toward “adaptive planning” which amounts to the globalisation of strategic nuclear war planning. Sarko refers to Iran but notice he also includes Asia.

Again Paris has raised the Euro deterrent issue

…”Regarding Europe, it is a fact that France’s nuclear forces by their very existence are a key element in its security,” he said.

“Let us together draw the logical conclusions: I propose to begin with those of our European partners who so desire an open dialogue on the role of deterrence and its contribution to our common security,” said Sarkozy…

Points (1) (2) and (3) match. Think of it like this. If France is developing a nuclear strategy in line with the sort of thinking about a “second nuclear age” as many do in the United States much of the air delivered nuclear capability of France becomes a Cold War era relic. A globalised nuclear strategy would naturally see France shift the burden even more toward sea based components of “deterrence.” This is not a “disarmament” measure as it has been presented. France is working on new boomers, new SLBM’s and the new TNO warhead for those SLBM’s. So (1) and (2) are linked.

(3) I have always felt is meant to deter the United States. If Europe is indeed to acquire an independent power projection capability to advance European interests, especially in the context of diminishing fossil fuel resources, then a European strategic nuclear capability would act as a shield or umbrella of power to buttress such a posture. The effect of this would be to reverse the effects of the Suez crisis and the main focus of deterrence would be the United States. (2) and (3) would become linked in this way.

Meanwhile it has been announced that London and Paris are to team together under a civil nuclear cooperation plan

…Britain and France will announce a deal to build new nuclear power stations and export the technology worldwide during President Nicolas Sarkozy’s state visit next week, the Guardian reported Saturday.

Britain approved the construction of a new generation of nuclear plants in January and wants to take advantage of French expertise to help build them, the paper said…

The plan will be announced at the stadium of Arsenal FC. This is kinda appropriate after all Arsenal’s manager is Arsene Wenger (French) and under his reign there has been a strong French connection Henry etc.

Of course notice that Sarko’s speech is not unrelated to this. Sarko singles out the Middle East as a source of nuclear proliferation concern yet Sarko has speed up France’s role in the drive for nuclear energy in the region. This is what is called international relations.

Notice that the French military-industrial complex has the same reason to talk up the Iran threat as the US military-industrial complex. Sarko was elected on a mandate to implement free market reforms in order to “reform France” but notice that means reforms directed toward the French urban poor and workers; such reforms are not meant for those sectors of the French state that aid the elite.

Again just like the US. No wonder that Sarko is hopping into bed with Washington on everything from Iran to the false state of “Kosovo.”