ISIS has two great reports on the Al Kibar reactor. The
first provides a pretty detailed analysis of the measures Syria used to conceal the reactor. I quite like the pipes from the box to the water treatment plant and the earthen walls. A nice touch.

ISIS makes some good points about some of the larger consequences of all this, for instance the limitations of safeguards, but their political correctness let’s them down. For example, the role that Syria plays in US strategic nuclear war planning is not discussed nor is the role that Israeli nuclear weapons play here much discussed either.

If Al Kibar was a plutonium production reactor then surely these demand side issues are worth reflecting upon if we want to be comprehensive in our analysis of the wider proliferation consequences of Al Kibar. But you can’t do that because that would mean that instead of discussing some other state’s nuclear programme you end up discussing your own.

The second ISIS analysis has some pretty good stuff too. This one, interesting enough, comes from an Israeli analyst. He states that the IC assesses the power output of Al Kibar to be 20MWt. Yongbyon is about 25-30MWt.

He makes the following observation. Firstly there is discussion on the piping of the heat removal system

…Because the heat removal system is dependent on the return piping to the river, inspectors are likely to concentrate on this piping. From ref.1 in can be seen that the outlet into the river is situated downstream of the inlet pumps, which is standard engineering practice…

Which opens up the following

…The diameter of this pipe is the best indication of the design power of the reactor. The diameter can be assessed by two methods: use of remote sensing or by simply uncovering the pipe. Remote-sensing equipment would include ground penetrating radar and magnetometers. These actions should not take place at the outlet, but at several places along the route from the main building to the river. If Syria disputes the results of the measurements, or if the inspectors are not satisfied with them, the pipe could be excavated at least at one untampered site along the pipe’s route. This is not a major undertaking, but the ground moving equipment must be made available by local authorities…

Hence IAEA inspections could provide us with verification about the crux of the matter that being the power output of the reactor.

Let them proceed.

Of course, the Israeli analyst won’t tell us much about Dimona.

I call this the proliferation fallacy…let us concentrate on everybody else’s nuclear activities except our own. For a proliferation expert to be a true moral agent he must concentrate on the activities of his own state first and foremost.

Israel’s role, and the US for that matter, in creating a structural demand side push for proliferation in the Middle East is not trivial.