One of the major themes of the 2020 summit concerned itself with Australia’s role in the world and national security policy. It is interesting that the summit discussed these issues precisely when the Government is in the middle of two very important defence policy planning processes one being an air capability review and the other detailed policy analysis for a Defence White Paper. The Government may well also institute a Foreign Policy White Paper.
In so far as policy planning is concerned a case could be made for the Government having gotten the whole process in the wrong order. Surely a foreign policy review should come first and only after such a review should detailed strategic policy analysis occur. After all to paraphrase that well worn phrase of Carl von Clausewitz “war is politics by other means”.
There has been plenty written and discussed on defence and foreign policy in recent times but it is interesting to reflect the total absence of the political Left, especially the ALP Left, in the whole process. That this absence should follow a period of unprecedented civil society interest in matters of strategy, given the Iraq war and wider issues on the US alliance raised by the war, makes this absence even more curious.
It should be stressed that this introverted sort of absent Left applies not only to matters of defence and foreign policy. For instance at the recently completed Maritime Union of Australia congress both Julia Gillard, from the soft Left and former luminary of the “socialist forum” and Anthony Albanese, perhaps the Federal Caucus’ leading firebrand, both pointedly refused to attend the MUA congress dinner even though the MUA is affiliated to the ALP. It would be unimaginable that a Cabinet minister would refuse an invitation to dinner with say a high flying corporate CEO. Lindsay Tanner, one of the most regarded Victorian Left MPs, happens also to be one of Australia’s leading supporters of neo-liberal globalisation.
Figures such as Tom Uren and Jim Cairns where not only leading lights in the ALP Left but they were some of Australia’s leading dissident public intellectuals. One would be struggling to find their equivalents today and it might well be the case that Mark Latham is now Australia’s leading dissident public intellectual, mostly writing in the financial press no less, which is saying something. Notice that this all is occurring when the formal power of the Left has never been greater.
There actually was a time when the Left played a key role in the defence policy debate indeed the wider policy debate in Australia. Some of the most vociferous policy debates within the Labor party revolved around international security issues. For instance there were always large sections of the ALP uncomfortable with not just the parameters of the alliance with the US but with the alliance itself. The Left always opposed “forward defence” and viewed with suspicion many aspects of Hawke Government defence policy on grounds that “forward defence” was abandoned in rhetoric only. The uranium debate was to a very large extent a global security debate.
What makes this particularly ironic is that on many aspects of defence and foreign policy Australian public opinion is to the Left of the ALP. Many Australians view US foreign policy with great concern and identify the US as one of the main sources of strategic danger in the world. Many oppose the shift toward an overt forward defence posture that characterised the Howard era. Many oppose uranium exports.
The Rudd Government shows no signs of abandoning “forward defence”. It is easy to see this because for all intents and purposes the Government shows no signs of any interest in reversing the previous Government’s defence capability plans. Concerns have been expressed about costs, the acquisition process and overall packaging but these are not really conceptual issues. Canberra very much remains committed to “interoperability” as a key concept driving defence capability planning.
Interoperability essentially means that Australian defence capabilities should be made interoperable with the United States armed forces for seamless global military interventions. This is what a defence capability shaped by “forward defence” would look like. This leads to anomalies in Australian defence planning.
For instance for purposes of “interoperability” the purchase of expensive M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tanks is great for joint operational armoured warfare in the Desert, say in the Middle East, but its utility for the direct defence of Australia is minimal if not non existent. It is said that the separate armed services of the Australian Defence Force are more “interoperable” with their US counterparts than with their Australian colleagues.
That is not just an anomaly it is downright silly. One important feature of modern operational warfare is known as “jointness”. Having armed services that end up being more interoperable with a foreign power hardly is meant to contribute to the “jointness” of the ADF.
Even if we were committed to “interoperability” there would still be plenty to criticise. For instance in the new US Army doctrine there is much greater emphasis on the role of counter-insurgency operations in future warfare. Australia could make a better contribution by delivering niche services. These niche services would precisely be of the sought necessary for operations in our own “arc of instability.”
But on top of all this comes the Alliance itself. At the insistence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington does not guarantee Australia’s security if attacked. It is precisely this non guarantee that compels Australia to participate in US military operations abroad. This, contrary to the standard almost spiritual view of the Alliance, means that Australian participation reflects the weakness of the Alliance not its strength.
Given the decoupling of global, and Australian, economic growth from US economic growth even the purely utilitarian value of the Alliance has decreased. In Howard era strategic policy documents US global primacy formed the main argument for the Alliance. But this primacy is in decline for the global economic balance of power is shifting to Asia.
Never have the traditional shibboleths of Australian strategic policy been as questioned by the public, and most questionable, than now. So when will the Left take notice and come up with some ideas for the future of Australia’s role in the world and our national security? It will be interesting to read Peter Garrett’s contributions in Cabinet in thirty years time.
